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We propose and experimentally implement a novel reconfigurable quantum key distribution (QKD)
scheme, where the users can switch in real time between conventional QKD and the recently-
introduced measurement-device-independent (MDI) QKD. Through this setup, we demonstrate the
distribution of quantum keys between three remote parties connected by only two quantum channels,
a previously unattempted task. Moreover, as a prominent application, we extract the first quantum
digital signature (QDS) rates from a network that uses a measurement-device-independent link. In
so doing, we introduce an efficient protocol to distil multiple signatures from the same block of data,
thus reducing the statistical fluctuations in the sample and increasing the final QDS rate.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cryptography is ubiquitous in modern society and es-
sential to countless applications relying on the confiden-
tiality, integrity and non-repudiation of sensible data [1].
Currently, the security of these applications is largely
based on public-key cryptography [2, 3], which is suppos-
edly secure against an eavesdropper with limited compu-
tational power. QKD, on the other hand, poses no re-
strictions on the attacker, apart from obeying the laws
of Nature, and one only makes assumptions on the de-
vices owned by the authorised users, which can be di-
rectly tested. In addition, the recent introduction of
MDI-QKD [4, 5] further enhances the positive features of
QKD. By clever use of the teleportation gate [6], MDI-
QKD turns the receiving side of QKD into a transmitter,
thus removing all the security assumptions on the detect-
ing devices, which are arguably most exposed to external
attacks [7–11]. Moreover, it allows two parties to connect
through a totally untrusted node. Recent experiments
have shown that it can be implemented with key rates
commensurate to those of QKD [12], whilst extending its
transmission distance [13].
Different from encryption, quantum digital signatures
(QDS) have also recently been introduced [14–16]. Quan-
tum signatures allow users to sign a document by quan-
tum means, and to transfer it to other users, with
information-theoretical security. The most recently pro-
posed quantum signature schemes [17] only need exper-
imental setups similar to those for QKD. In analogy
with MDI-QKD, measurement-device-independent quan-
tum signatures have also been proposed [18].
Therefore, various quantum communication schemes
are already available and the specific application deter-
mines which is the most suitable in a given situation.
In such a scenario, it becomes important to be able to
switch between different protocols, in order to adapt to
FIG. 1. Fiber-based reconfigurable MDI/QKD net-
work. The key elements are coloured red. The rotator (R) in
Charlie’s station sets each detector to measure a different po-
larization state, H, horizontal, V , vertical, D, diagonal, and
A, anti-diagonal. The intensity modulators (IMs) can be set
to high attenuation, to nearly stop the light passing through
them (“Stop” in the figure). This can enable Alice-Bob MDI-
QKD, when no IM is set to Stop, or Alice-Charlie QKD, when
Bob’s IM is set to Stop, or Bob-Charlie QKD, when Alice’s
IM is set to Stop. At the same time, the IMs can be used to
prepare decoy states [19–22]. PM: polarization modulation;
BS: beam splitter; PBS: polarising beam splitter.
a specific demand. For instance, let us consider the basic
three-point network depicted in Fig. 1, where two distant
users, Alice and Bob, are connected through a central
node, Charlie. In some cases, Alice and Bob might want
to communicate privately through Charlie’s relay station.
For that, they can run the decoy-state MDI-QKD pro-
tocol [5] using the equipment shown in Fig. 1. In par-
ticular, the two intensity modulators (IM) allow them
to implement the decoy-state technique [19–22]. The re-
sulting key will be unknown to Charlie and to any ex-
ternal eavesdropper, and secure against attacks directed
at Charlie’s equipment. In other cases, Alice and Bob
might want to communicate directly with Charlie, who
then represents a legitimate user and can exchange keys
with them via QKD. In the scheme in Fig. 1, a QKD
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2transmission between Alice (Bob) and Charlie is obtained
by stopping the light emitted by Bob (Alice) through the
same IMs employed for the decoy-state MDI-QKD proto-
col. If the users’ devices are trusted, the resulting QKD
transmission will feature quantum security against ex-
ternal eavesdroppers and it will be fast, with megabits of
key material distributed every second. The possibility to
switch between QKD and MDI-QKD constitutes a “re-
configurable MDI/QKD network”, a concept introduced
in [23] for free-space quantum communications.
In this work, we experimentally realise the fiber-based
reconfigurable MDI/QKD network sketched in Fig. 1. By
sending light to the central beam-splitter (BS), Alice and
Bob can distil a key via MDI-QKD, whereas by stop-
ping one of the light beams, Alice or Bob can distil keys
with Charlie via QKD. Stopping the light beams is simple
in our scheme, as it is effected through the same inten-
sity modulators employed to implement the BB84 proto-
col [24] with decoy states [19–21], both in QKD [22] and
in MDI-QKD [5]. The obtained key rates range from
hundreds of bits per second (bps) to hundreds of kilobits
per second (kbps) for MDI-QKD, and from hundreds of
kbps to millions of bps (Mbps) for QKD.
In addition, the setup can be used in a way different
from standard QKD and MDI-QKD, to realise quantum
signatures. As a striking example of this, we experi-
mentally estimate the first QDS rates mediated by an
QKD/MDI-QKD setup. The resulting rates are in the
order of 1 signature in 45 seconds for the MDI-QKD link
and 1 signature in 72 ms for a QKD link used for signa-
ture distribution, the former referring to a 50 km optical
fiber, the latter to a 25 km one. QKD can be a point-
to-point application with only two users in the simplest
scenario. For quantum signatures, on the other hand,
three parties, all pairwise connected, is the minimal sce-
nario. Our QKD/MDI-QKD setup implements the three
required quantum communication links using only two
physical links.
EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
To implement the fiber-based reconfigurable MDI/QKD
network, we adopt a polarization-based setup. We denote
by H, V , D and A the horizontal, vertical, diagonal and
anti-diagonal states of linear polarization, respectively,
and with Z and X the rectilinear and diagonal bases,
composed of the states {H,V } and {D,A}, respectively.
The setup makes use of the decoy-state technique to im-
prove the key rate and extend the transmission distance.
Therefore the preparation step also includes the selec-
tion of the intensity of the pulses to be sent to Charlie.
In this case, we adopt the scheme with four intensity
classes [12, 25], indicated as s (“signal”), u (“decoy1”), v
(“decoy2”) and w (“vacuum”). The signal s is the only
one prepared in the Z basis, whereas u, v and w are all
prepared in the X basis. The quantum keys and sig-
natures are extracted from the s pulses in the Z basis,
whereas the X basis is for testing the quantum channel
against the presence of an eavesdropper. To increase the
final key rate, the basis Z is selected more often than X.
The preparation of the pulses in the experimental
setup is effected through the transmitter depicted in
Fig. 2. Alice and Bob create low-jitter 32-ps light
pulses at 1549.8 nm using the pulsed laser seeding tech-
nique [12]. The master laser is input to the slave via a cir-
culator and the AC voltage is temporally offset between
the two lasers to ensure injection occurs at the correct
time. The 1-GHz gain switching of both lasers ensures
that all pulses are phase-randomised [26, 27]. Alice and
Bob’s pulses are then passed through separate 30 GHz
bandwidth filters to remove noise. The polarization of
the pulses is controlled using electric polarization con-
trollers, which can create all of the required polarization
states. An attenuator provides the four photon fluxes (s,
u, v, w) before they are sent to Charlie.
Charlie is composed of the interfering beam split-
ter (BS), two polarising BS (PBS) aligned along the Z
axis, one polarization rotator (R) and four InGaAs self-
differencing avalanche photodiodes, run at room temper-
ature, clocked at 1 GHz and featuring an average effi-
ciency of 20.9%. Overall, the setup shows similarities
with a realisation of the original decoy-state MDI-QKD
scheme [5] and the one realised in [12]. However, dif-
ferently from previous implementations, the rotator R
placed after one output port of Charlie’s BS turns a Z-
basis analyser into an X-basis analyser. This is the key
element for enabling reconfigurable MDI/QKD as it al-
lows the realization of a full QKD receiver, measuring
the incoming pulses in the Z and X bases. On the other
hand, it entails that all the coincidence counts from de-
tectors H and V can be treated as in the original MDI-
QKD scheme, whereas coincidence counts from detectors
on different output ports of Charlie’s BS cannot be used
to distil key bits, as they belong to different bases. A
coincidence count between H and V indicates projection
onto the triplet Bell state |ψ+〉 = 1/√2(|HV 〉+ |V H〉) =
1/
√
2(|DD〉 − |AA〉). In this case, Bob flips (does not
flip) his bit to match Alice’s bit if the rectilinear (diag-
onal) basis was used in the preparation step. The same
argument applies to the X-basis branch, by replacing H
with D and V with A. Alice, Bob and Charlie share a
common reference clock, allowing Alice and Bob to align
their pulses, so to arrive coincidentally at Charlie, and
allowing Charlie to align his detectors.
To effect the selection between MDI-QKD and QKD,
Alice and Bob act on their IMs to send or stop the light
directed to Charlie. In particular, when Alice (Bob) pre-
pares the vacuum state w, the amount of light travelling
towards Charlie is so small that the situation is virtu-
ally identical to having the AC (BC) link disconnected
and QKD enabled on the BC (AC) link. Any poten-
tial residual light in the vacuum state does not affect the
security of the scheme, as it directly translates into an in-
crease of the measured quantum bit error rate (QBER).
Also, if there are multiple counts in Charlie’s detectors
3FIG. 2. Transmitting module. Two replicas of the de-
picted fiber-based setup are used by Alice and Bob to trans-
mit light pulses to Charlie. Master and slave lasers’ driving
signals are displayed alongside the equipment and are set dif-
ferently for the two lasers. A power meter connected to the
output beam splitter is used to attenuate the outgoing op-
tical pulses to the correct level. The wavelength filter (λ)
is for enhancing the indistinguishability of Alice’s and Bob’s
photons.
during the QKD sessions, they can be treated using the
squashing model for the passive BB84 protocol [28, 29].
Finally, in some cases, neither Alice or Bob will prepare
a vacuum state, whereas in other cases they both will.
Such instances can be employed to enable an MDI-QKD
communication back again. In other terms, the vacuum
state acts as a switch between the different modalities
of communication, QKD or MDI-QKD, thus enabling a
reconfigurable MDI/QKD network (see details in [30]).
Key rates
Using the described setup, we run QKD and MDI-QKD
experiments, deriving key rates versus distance, as de-
picted in Fig. 3. We performed two sets of experiments.
In the first, we used variable optical attenuators to sim-
ulate a lossy channel with 0.2 dB/km, as in a typical op-
tical fiber at 1550 nm. In the second, we used two 25 km
reels of a standard optical fiber. The circles (squares) are
for the attenuator-based MDI-QKD link (QKD links),
whereas the stars represent the points obtained using a
real fiber. Finally, the solid lines are theoretical simula-
tions tailored to our experimental setup. Tables contain-
ing all the measured counts are reported in [30].
From Fig. 3, it is apparent that the theory reproduces
the experimental results well, both for attenuators and
real fiber, with only a slightly lower experimental rate for
the fiber due to a correspondingly higher QBER. This
allowed us to use a simulation to optimise the system
before performing real experiments. The key rates for
MDI-QKD are between 606 bps for an equivalent dis-
tance of 90 km and 134 kbps at slightly more than 0 km.
QKD is faster, providing key rates ranging from about
0.5 Mbps at 45 km to almost 5 Mbps at 0 km. This
difference in the key rates led us to set the probability
of an MDI-QKD run equal to 500 times that of a QKD
run. In a network with three users, this would provide
comparable key rates for all users, on average, over all
FIG. 3. Secure key rates versus distance. MDI-QKD
(top diagram) and QKD (centre and bottom diagrams) se-
cure key rates for a Z (X) basis probability equal to 80%
(20%) and a security parameter sec . 10−10 are shown as
a function of distance. Because the reconfigurable scheme is
symmetrically deployed, the distance between Alice and Bob
(top) is approximately twice the distance between Alice and
Charlie (centre) and Bob and Charlie (bottom). All the dis-
tances have been calculated assuming 0.2 dB/km attenuation
on the channel, except for the data points indicated by stars,
where a real fiber was used. The projected time to attain the
shown key rates is 25 hours of which 3 minutes are spent on
QKD and the rest on MDI-QKD, to balance their key rates.
distances. Before performing the experiment, the setup
was optimised for MDI-QKD. Then, key rates were ac-
quired for both MDI-QKD and QKD without additional
calibrations.
Key rates in Fig. 3 were calculated using composable
security proofs in the finite-size scenario [31, 32] with a
procedure similar to the one described in [12]. With the
proviso that the key bits are extracted in the Z basis, we
drop the index Z and write them as
RMDI = S1,1[1− h(e1,1ph )]− leakMDIEC −∆MDI,
RQKD = S1[1− h(e1ph)]− leakQKDEC −∆QKD. (1)
In Eq. (1), the labels “MDI” and “QKD” refer to MDI-
QKD and QKD, respectively. The quantities S and eph
indicate single-photon counts and single-photon phase-
error rate, respectively, in the Z basis and intensity class
s, estimated by applying the decoy-state technique to the
X-basis data sample and then extending to the Z basis
using standard statistical tools [30]. The function h is the
binary entropy. The upper and lower bars are for upper
and lower bounds and the superscripts ‘1’ or ‘1,1’ refer to
one sender (QKD) or two senders (MDI-QKD) emitting
single photons. The quantity leakEC is the amount of
bits used to correct errors in the Z basis, while the ∆
terms take into account the finite-size effect.
4FIG. 4. MDI-QKD-mediated QDS. The signature is sent
by Alice to Bob using an MDI-QKD setup, over an optical
fiber with a total length of 50 km. The protocol is denoted
“MDI-QKD\EP”, where “\EP” stands for “without error cor-
rection and privacy amplification”. QKD\EP is used to send
a signature from Alice to Charlie, whereas full QKD is used
to distribute keys between Bob and Charlie to allow for the
symmetrisation step of QDS (see [30] for more details). The
QKD links are implemented with two 25-km reels of single-
mode fiber.
QUANTUM DIGITAL SIGNATURES MEDIATED
BY MDI-QKD
Digital signatures play a vital role in software distribu-
tion, modern communication and financial transactions,
where it is essential to detect forgery and tampering. Sig-
natures are a cryptographic technique for validating the
authenticity and integrity of messages, software, or digi-
tal documents.
In the simplest case, a digital signature scheme involves
three parties, see Fig. 4. One of them, Alice, signs a doc-
ument and sends it to a receiver, Bob, who accepts it
after checking that the signature is genuine. The same
document can also be transferred by Bob to a third user,
Charlie, for verification purposes. The users can also
exchange their roles giving rise to similar schemes. Dif-
ferently from encryption, the goal of digital signatures
is demonstrating the authenticity of a signed message to
multiple recipients rather than keeping it secret. How-
ever, only the legitimate sender should be able to sign
messages, to prevent forging of signatures by illegitimate
users.
Digital signatures are currently implemented using
public-key cryptography [2, 3] for which security depends
on the computational power of an adversary. On the
other hand, QDS provide information-theoretic security
based on the laws of quantum physics. While the sem-
inal work on QDS described in [14] required the use of
a quantum memory, recent developments have removed
this restriction [15, 33] and combined QDS with exist-
ing QKD and MDI-QKD schemes [17, 18]. Experiments
have been performed for QDS up to distances of 90 km
in optical fiber [34–36]. However, this was achieved using
a protocol secure only against individual attacks in the
asymptotic scenario. More importantly, in all previous
schemes, three or more physical channels were envisaged
to implement the QDS protocol between three parties
and none of them was assigned to MDI-QKD.
We implement QDS with only two optical channels us-
ing reconfigurable MDI/QKD. The adopted configura-
tion is summarised in Fig. 4. Two 25-km optical fibers
connect Alice and Bob to Charlie whereas there is no di-
rect fiber between Alice and Bob, who are linked only by
the intermediate node using MDI-QKD. We choose this
particular realization of QDS to demonstrate signature
distribution based on MDI-QKD. However, given the key
rates represented by stars in Fig. 3, we could also have
used the setup with the signing party at the “Charlie”
node, in which case MDI-QKD would be used to encrypt
the symmetrising exchange of signature bits between the
two recipients at the “Alice” and “Bob” nodes. There-
fore our demonstration is not limited to the particular
case represented in Fig. 4. Let us also remark that, to
strengthen our demonstration, we used real fiber to per-
form the QDS experiment.
To demonstrate QDS mediated by MDI-QKD, we em-
ploy a protocol that combines those presented in [17] and
[18]. It adopts MDI-QKD without error correction and
privacy amplification (denoted by “MDI-QKD\EP”) for
the signature between Alice and Bob, QKD\EP for the
signature between Alice and Charlie, and full QKD be-
tween Bob and Charlie to enable the symmetrisation step
of the protocol (see [30] for details). All the results in the
X basis are publicly revealed, whereas only a small por-
tion of the Z basis results are disclosed, to estimate the
QBER in this basis. The remaining undisclosed bits are
used for quantum digital signatures.
Signature rates
Here we extract the specific parameters of a QDS proto-
col, i.e., the size of signatures and the security parameters
against forging and non-repudiation [17, 18]. For that, we
introduce a protocol with a different finite-size treatment
than previous protocols, to increase the QDS rate.
In the finite-size scenario, the users acquire data for a
finite amount of time, until the data block is large enough
to guarantee small statistical fluctuations in the parame-
ters estimated from the data set. Then they proceed and
acquire the next block of data. The current approach
for QDS is to distil a single signature from every block
of data. Therefore, to increase the QDS rate, it is opti-
mal to keep the data block as small as possible, so as to
have more blocks in a given time interval. This, however,
makes statistical fluctuations larger, thus worsening the
estimation of the quantum-related parameters and the
QDS rate.
In our protocol, we still perform a single decoy-state
parameter estimation per each block of data. However,
we consider the extraction of multiple signatures from
the same data block. This allows us to acquire a large
data set, minimising the statistical fluctuations, and at
the same time distil as many signatures as possible from
each acquired block. We estimate that this improves the
5QDS rate by about 10 times over the standard approach,
depending on the experimental conditions.
We start from analysing the MDI-QKD-mediated QDS
rate on the link connecting Alice and Bob. Then we will
apply an analogous procedure in order to estimate the
QDS rate on the QKD link between Alice and Charlie.
The QDS protocol also includes a symmetrization step
between Bob and Charlie performed on a secure chan-
nel [17, 18, 30]. This can be enabled by running QKD on
the remaining link between Bob and Charlie. The spe-
cific key rate for this scheme would be the one showed in
the bottom diagram of Fig. 3.
As a first QDS-specific quantity, we evaluate the mini-
mum rate pMDIE at which Eve can introduce errors on the
MDI-QKD link. This is given by
h
(
pMDIE
)
= S1,1sig/C
s,s
sig [1− h(e1,1ph ,sig)], (2)
which is derived from Eq. (1), omitting the error cor-
rection and, for simplicity, the finite-size terms [18]. In
Eq. (2), the subscript ‘sig’ indicates that the quanti-
ties refer to the block from which signatures are ex-
tracted. In the QDS protocol, Alice randomly selects
Cs,ssig = 2.5 × 106 bits from the Z-basis block, to form
one of the signature blocks. Because this size is smaller
than the Z-basis dataset, she will be able to extract mul-
tiple signature blocks from it, all with size Cs,ssig . She then
applies decoy-state estimation to find, for the signature
block, the lower bound for Charlie’s counts due to single-
photon pulses and the corresponding upper bound for
the phase-error rate. In our experiment the two bounds
are S1,1sig = 666, 345 bits and e
1,1
ph,sig = 0.053, respectively,
leading to pMDIE = 0.0286.
The next step is to determine an upper bound for
the QBER in the signature blocks, E
s,s
sig . For that,
the QBER was directly measured on a sample set of
Cs,stest = 1, 714, 426 bits and found to be E
s,s
test = 0.5% (see
also Table 4 in [30]). The measured block can be thought
of as a random sample drawn from the overall Z-basis
population. Therefore the measured QBER is represen-
tative of the QBER in the non-measured fraction of the
population. From this fraction, the users select several
blocks of size Cs,ssig to form the signatures. The QBER
in each signature block is then estimated, by applying
Serfling’s inequality [38], to be
E
s,s
sig = E
s,s
test +
√
(Cs,ssig + 1)(C
s,s
sig + C
s,s
test)
2 Cs,stest(C
s,s
sig )
2
ln(1/H). (3)
The estimation in Eq. (3) provides E
s,s
sig = 0.0085 when
we set H = 2 × 10−11. After calculating suitable au-
thentication and verification parameters, sab = 0.0152
and svb = 0.0219, we obtain the length of a signature
LMDIsig by inverting the relation
PMDIrep ≤ exp
[−(svb − sab)2LMDIsig /4] ≤ 0.5× 10−10, (4)
which sets the repudiation probability PMDIrep to less than
0.5 × 10−10 [17, 18]. The resulting value for LMDIsig is
2.11 × 106, which is smaller than the set value of Cs,ssig ,
showing that Eq. (4) holds in our experiment when we
take Cs,ssig as the signature length. The overall failure
probability at the end of the QDS distillation is less than
10−10.
A signature of size Cs,ssig can be generated with our sys-
tem in 45 seconds on average. This is a remarkable speed
for MDI-QKD-mediated QDS, if the increased security
level entailed by measurement-device-independence is
taken into account. The average time results from the
ratio of the total acquisition time in an experiment with
an 80:20 bias between the Z and the X bases divided
by the 1, 974 different signatures generated from the ac-
quired data block. The reported average time includes
the QKD operations on the other two links. The analysis
of MDI-QKD-based signatures is completed by calculat-
ing the probabilities of honest abort, Phab, and forging,
Pfor, which are confirmed to be much smaller than the
set threshold 10−10 with our experimental parameters.
As an additional step in the QDS scheme, we now eval-
uate the QDS rate on the 25-km QKD link between Alice
and Charlie (see Fig. 4). We repeat similar calculations
as for the MDI-QKD link. We set the size of the signa-
ture block to Cssig = 150, 000 bits, randomly selected in
the Z-basis data block acquired by operating QKD on
the AC-link. In the signature block, the lower bound for
Charlie’s counts due to single-photon pulses amounts to
S1sig = 86, 563 and the upper bound for the phase-error
rate is e1ph,sig = 0.0237, leading to p
QKD
E = 0.105.
The actual QBER in the Z basis was measured on a
sample of 46, 979, 354 bits and amounts to Estest = 0.0017
(see also Table 3 in [30]). From it, using an equation sim-
ilar to Eq. (3), we obtain an upper bound E
s
sig = 0.0108,
which is less than pQKDE , thus providing a positive QDS
rate. To determine the rate, we calculate sac = 0.0421
and svc = 0.0734 and obtain a signature length L
QKD
sig =
103, 336 by inverting an equation similar to Eq. (4), but
with pQKDrep replacing p
MDI
rep . The total repudiation proba-
bility is then given by the sum pQKDrep + p
MDI
rep .
The total time the system would spend acquiring QKD
data on the AC link is about 36 seconds. The resulting
data block would be enough to distil signatures for 2,506
1-bit messages, thus providing an average time for the
QKD-only operations on the AC link equal to 72 ms for
each signed bit. A similar value of 74 ms could have been
obtained on the QKD link between Bob and Charlie if we
had used it to distil signatures rather than for encryption.
Although the reported values can be further improved by
optimising the initial parameters set by Alice and Bob,
they are already in line with state-of-the-art QDS, espe-
cially when considering the fact that the present scheme
offers security in the finite-size scenario against the most
general attack allowed by the laws of physics.
6CONCLUSION
Fig. 1 shows a small quantum network, where Charlie
can either act as an “end user” or as a relay between the
other two users. In the former case, he is a legitimate
trusted party; this could be the case e.g. if the setup is
used for standard QKD between Alice and Charlie. In
the latter case, Charlie might not be trusted, but the
MDI-QKD protocol guarantees that he cannot compro-
mise the security of the overall network. This is particu-
larly important in a QDS distribution scheme, where all
parties need to cooperate to distil valid signatures, but
where none of the participants are fully trusted.
From a security point of view, the key distributed be-
tween Alice and Bob via the MDI modality is the most
secure and is also guaranteed against any attack directed
at Charlie’s detectors. This guarantee does not apply to
the QKD modality. However, the QKD modality is much
faster and can serve different, rate-hungry, applications.
Interestingly, the considered reconfigurable network only
uses two optical links to distribute quantum keys and sig-
natures between three users. This scales favourably. If
the relay is the central node of a star network, quantum
strings can be distributed among N parties using only
N − 1 optical links, as opposed to directly connecting all
the parties with N(N−1)/2 links. While this is common
to all star networks, it should be stressed that in this case
the central node is totally untrusted, a positive feature
due to the MDI-QKD protocol.
The above-described scheme allows to switch between
QKD and MDI-QKD in real time, using exactly the same
equipment for QKD as in MDI-QKD, with the exception
of a single rotator added to Charlie’s module. We have
experimentally demonstrated its practicality by obtain-
ing QKD and MDI-QKD key rates as well as the first
QDS rates mediated by MDI-QKD. In the QDS exper-
iment, about 45 seconds and 72 ms were required, on
average, to acquire enough signature material to sign 1
bit from the MDI-QKD protocol over a 50 km optical
fiber and from the QKD protocol over a 25 km optical
fibre, respectively. To increase the efficiency of the dis-
tillation, we have introduced an original treatment of the
finite-size effect, detailed in [30], where multiple signa-
tures were distilled from the same block of data, thus al-
leviating the detrimental effect of statistical fluctuations.
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